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WAITING FOR GLUSKABE: AN EXAMINATION OF 
MAINE’S COLONIALIST LEGACY SUFFERED BY 
NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES UNDER THE MAINE 
INDIAN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1980 
Joseph G.E. Gousse* 
“In the absence of justice, what is sovereignty but organized robbery?” 
—Saint Augustine (354-430 A.D.) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Legends of the Wabanaki people tell of a mythical demigod named Gluskabe.1  
Immortalized through the cultural traditions of the Wabanaki—from the Mi’kmaq, 
Abenaki, and Passamaquoddy to the Maliseet and the Penobscot—Gluskabe 
appears as an integral component of each tribe’s variation of the Creation Myth, as 
well as numerous other tales and stories.2  Most prominently, Gluskabe is known 
for his role in creating the Penobscot River and divining proportion and harmony in 
the natural world, using his power to reduce the size of the once-giant land animals 
that proved too destructive to coexist with humankind.3  After helping humankind 
to establish the first village, legend holds that Gluskabe retired to the southernmost 
portion of the land, into the sunset, awaiting the time when he would once again be 
called upon to restore balance to the natural world and defend his people in their 
hour of greatest need. 
So begins the story of Gluskabe and the Water Monster (sometimes referred to 
as the Water Famine myth).4  According to legend, the First People lived along the 
mighty Penobscot River and drew life from its cold, pristine waters, irrigating their 
crops, harvesting fish, and sustaining their health by the grace of its bounty.  One 
day, the river’s mighty current slowed to a sluggish trickle, and the river’s cold, 
pristine waters were replaced by yellow, stinking puddles that would gather in the 
absence of the once mighty current.  No rain or snow could replenish the river, and 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maine School of Law. I would like to thank Professor 
Orlando E. Delogu for his valuable insight and wisdom, kindly shared and greatly appreciated. And, of 
course, Amanda: your unwavering love gives me purpose each day.  Weliwoni. 
 1. Laura Redish & Orrin Lewis, Legendary Native American Figures: Wabanaki Confederacy 
(Wabenaki, Wobenaki), NATIVE LANGUAGES OF THE AMERICAS http://www.native-
languages.org/wabanaki.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2014) The Wabanaki Confederacy was a coalition of 
five Algonquian tribes- the Abenaki, Mi’kmaq, Penboscot, Passamaquoddy and Maliseet. Id. The 
spelling of Gluskabe’s name varies greatly by source based on language and dialect, although the 
general structure and phonetics remain a common thread throughout the appearance of the name. 
Variations include: Glooscap, Glooskap, Klouscap, Gluskabi, Gluskonba, and many other, similar 
treatments all referring to the same legendary figure. See Legendary Native American Figures: 
Glooskap (Glooscap), NATIVE LANGUAGES OF THE AMERICAS, http://www.native-
languages.org/glooskap.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2014)  
 2. Redish & Lewis, supra note 1. See also FRANK G. SPECK, PENOBSCOT MAN 52 (1997). 
 3. See SPECK, supra note 2, at 52, 82. 
 4. See id. at 209; AMERICAN INDIAN MYTHS AND LEGENDS 181-84 (Richard Erdoes & Alfonso 
Ortiz eds., 1984) [hereinafter ERDOES & ORTIZ]. 
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the First People became sick, desperate for clean water. 
Worried for the future of their tribe, the First People held a council and sent a 
man north from the village to follow the riverbed, to see if he could discover why 
the Great River had stopped flowing.  The man set out and walked and walked until 
he came upon a strange and terrifying creature who, sitting in the riverbed, had 
halted the river’s mighty current. 
The man summoned his courage and asked the Water Monster to please move, 
so as to allow the river to flow as it once had.  The Water Monster roared, shaking 
the nearby forest: 
  Do as you please, do as you please! 
  I don’t care, I don’t care! 
  If you want water, if you want water, 
  Go elsewhere! Go elsewhere!5 
Fearing for his life, the man fled, returning to the First People with news of the 
Water Monster.  The First People were terrified to hear the man’s story.  Seeing the 
people’s fear, Gluskabe appeared.  Gluskabe knew that he must restore the water to 
the people, for he was their protector.  So, Gluskabe prepared for war; he made 
himself twelve feet tall.  He painted his body as red as blood and adorned his head 
with two hundred eagle feathers.  He painted yellow rings around his eyes and 
snarled his teeth fearsomely.  He growled a thunderous war cry that shook the 
forests, and he fashioned a knife from a nearby mountain of flint. 
Gluskabe went to where the Water Monster lay in the riverbed and demanded 
that the Water Monster restore the river to the First People.  The Water Monster 
only laughed, and opened his mouth a mile wide so as to eat Gluskabe.  Gluskabe 
wrestled with the Water Monster’s powerful jaws and drew his knife, cutting open 
the belly of the Water Monster.  As Gluskabe’s blade opened the Water Monster, 
all the cold, pristine water that the river had once brought to the First People began 
to flow once more.  Having returned life to his people by restoring the Great River, 
Gluskabe, the great warrior and protector, vanished into the forest until the day his 
people would next need him. 
The story of Gluskabe and the Water Monster is perhaps more pertinent today 
than ever before.  The legend teaches the importance of balance in nature and 
honors the Wabanaki cultural hero, and serves as an allegory for the contemporary 
struggles of the present-day descendants of the original storytellers who first 
breathed life into the heroic Gluskabe legend.  The story of Gluskabe and the Water 
Monster addresses the consequences suffered by a society when its most precious 
resource and source of identity is jeopardized.  This story also illustrates tribal 
sovereignty through collective decision-making and teaches the sanctity and 
importance of protecting tribal resources.  Today, the story of Gluskabe and the 
Water Monster is more relevant than ever before because it came true.  
In 1980, the State of Maine, by and through congressional approval, enacted 
the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act (MICSA) as a means of quelling 
centuries-old paranoia about who in the state, between the tribes and the 
                                                                                                     
 5. See ERDOES & ORTIZ, supra note 4 at 183. 
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government, had the right to proper title for vast expanses of land.6  As a direct 
result of contentious debate between the two sides (as well as the perception that a 
decisive victory would have devastating implications for either party), the State and 
the Maine tribes negotiated and settled the land claims that had been at issue since 
the early 1970’s when a Maine attorney named Tom Tureen sought to facilitate 
federal representation of the tribes in an effort to recover monetary damages from 
the State for both the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot tribes.7 
As a result of the “compromises” forged under MICSA (and subsequent case 
law interpreting the Act), Maine tribes have been stripped of their status as 
sovereign nations—an injury not only to the efficacious operation of any system of 
governance, but a particularly crippling blow given the tribes’ historic 
disenfranchisement in Maine.  
This Comment argues that though MICSA allegedly strikes a compromise 
between the tribes and the State that seeks to honor tribal autonomy with respect to 
internal tribal matters in exchange for settlement of, and quieted title to, vast 
swaths of contested Maine land, it actually establishes an ambiguous legal regime 
under which the Maine Law Court has occasionally been forced to construe the Act 
narrowly, having the effect of unduly limiting tribal autonomy within the 
boundaries of MICSA.  In other words, MICSA did not represent a “compromise in 
the truest sense,” as some state officials posited,8 but instead succeeded in entitling 
the State to ownership of unconscionably large swaths of land that the State 
desperately sought to legitimize, in exchange for: monetary awards 
disproportionately small in comparison to the value of relinquished lands; 
miniscule tribal reservation lands; and, extinguishment of full tribal sovereignty in 
exchange for a limited quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal status.  The ramifications 
of this quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal status have been profound and devastating, 
infringing upon tribal autonomy, and weakening the identity of a people. 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief examination and narrative of Native 
American interactions with both historic and contemporary society in the United 
States, so as to provide context for the unique relationship that governs discourse 
between the Maine tribes and the State.  In so doing, this Comment characterizes 
the impact that MICSA has had as an assault upon the limited autonomy afforded 
to the tribes pursuant to their quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal status.  When 
examining tribal-societal interactions, this Comment focuses on the legal lineage of 
controlling Native lands from the Non-Intercourse Act of 1790,9 to intervention by 
the United States Supreme Court in 1823, to the transfer of illegitimate title from 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to Maine upon entering the Union in 1820, 
up to the Federal District Court decisions which opened the floodgates to allow for 
                                                                                                     
 6. See NEIL ROLDE, UNSETTLED PAST, UNSETTLED FUTURE: THE STORY OF MAINE INDIANS 45 
(2004). 
 7. See id. at 19, 27. 
 8. Proposed Settlement of Maine Indian Land Claims: Hearings on S. 2829 Before the Select 
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 96th Cong. 37, 163 (1980) reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
MAINE INDIAN LAND CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT ) (Me. State Law & Legis. Reference Library ed., 
2008) (statement of Attorney General Richard Cohen recommending the adoption of the negotiated 
settlement agreement). 
 9. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012). 
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litigation of the Land Claims issue in the 1970’s. 
Part III examines the evolution and history of the Maine Indian Land Claims 
issue and Settlement in order to establish the socio-political atmosphere from 
which the land claims arose.  In doing so, Part III provides a comprehensive review 
of MICSA, including an analysis of the goals and intentions of both sides involved 
in the negotiation process; characterization of the tribes as federally-recognized, 
quasi-sovereign entities; and a review of the sections of MICSA that play the most 
prominent role in limiting tribal autonomy within these unique boundaries.  
Finally, Part IV builds upon Part III’s analysis of MICSA’s provisions by 
arguing that MICSA has had—and, if left uncorrected, will continue to have—a 
devastating effect on the tribes’ ability to meaningfully self-govern with regard to 
the “internal tribal matters” question.  By examining the Law Court’s oscillation 
between both narrow and broad interpretations of MICSA’s “internal tribal 
matters” language, this Comment argues that the ambiguous language of section 
6206 of MICSA, coupled with the posture of cases before the Court, has pressed 
the Law Court to reach inconsistent treatment of the “internal tribal matters” 
language.  This Comment takes the position that, given such unsettled precedent, 
the Law Court should apply a definitively broad interpretation of MICSA’s 
ambiguous language so as to permit tribal autonomy to the greatest extent possible 
consistent with both legitimate and far-reaching state interests, and the unique 
quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal status of the tribes. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COLONIAL, FEDERAL, AND STATE INTERCOURSE WITH 
NATIVE AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES, MASSACHUSETTS, AND POST-1820 
MAINE 
It is fitting that the first case to which many American law students are 
introduced in their studies is Johnson v. M’Intosh.10 The lessons to which first-year 
law students are introduced in M’Intosh are “fitting” because M’Intosh serves as 
the legal, ethical, and moral framework upon which all heretofore, contemporary, 
and future American economic, political, and civil transactions are predicated and 
justified, regardless of legal interest or specialty. 
Although interaction with the native people of North America began well 
before the issues that yielded the litigation of M’Intosh, the case serves as the best 
frame of reference to gauge the direction of both prior and future interactions with 
the tribes.  Authored by one of the Court’s most revered chief justices, John 
Marshall, M’Intosh arose out of a land dispute between two landowners, each with 
title to an overlapping portion of land in the Wabash River basin—located in 
present-day Illinois.11  The dispute centered around one landowner’s assertion of 
superior title to the land via direct sale from the Piankeshaw Indian tribe, and the 
other landowner’s claim of better title to the same parcel of land via purchase from 
the American government.12  As law students often learn in first-year Property 
                                                                                                     
 10. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
 11. Id. at 549-51.  
 12. See WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN 
LAW CASES EVER DECIDED 62-68 (2010).  Echo-Hawk explains that, unbeknownst to a majority of law 
students and scholars familiar with M’Intosh, the entire case was a “scam.”  Echo-Hawk reveals that the 
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courses, the Court’s holding in M’Intosh established the “doctrine of discovery,” a 
convention of Eurocentric colonialism which presupposed European supremacy in 
determining “absolute ultimate title” to “undiscovered lands” in the New World 
relative to the perceived illegitimacy of native land claims.13  
The M’Intosh Court reasoned that a “right of occupancy” or “right of 
possession” was vested in the Native Americans, but that a superior right—the 
right to “absolute ultimate title”—had vested in the Crown upon the “discovery” of 
the Americas.14  According to the Marshall Court, under the European laws of 
conquest, it was this “absolute right to title” that could extinguish the “mere right 
of occupancy” of the Native Americans, who had the right to occupy and possess 
the lands upon which they had lived since time immemorial, only until 
proclamation by the Crown extinguished these rights.15  Making the inferential leap 
that this interpretation of European conquest laws was neatly supported and valid 
by default, Marshall next declared that because lands taken from the Native 
Americans under the doctrine of discovery granted superior, absolute right to title 
to the British, any land ceded by the British to the new American nation in the 
Post-Revolutionary Era transported with it this “absolute right” to the Americans.16  
Ultimately, this line of reasoning led Marshall to declare that title to American land 
was vested in the American government by way of absolute title to the first 
European conquerors.17  Native Americans were adjudged by the Supreme Court to 
be forever “tenants whose occupancy can be terminated by purchase or conquest at 
the will of the American government,” granting them only a “second-class property 
right” in the lands upon which they lived.18 
A. European Conquest and the American Non-Intercourse Act of 1790 
The M’Intosh decision, rendered in 1823, relied heavily upon the Marshall 
Court’s interpretation of the European laws of conquest, which when examined, 
reflect very similar treatment of Native American property rights as those 
articulated in the Non-Intercourse Act of 1790.19  
                                                                                                     
parties involved were, in reality, hand-picked by Robert Goodloe Harper, an attorney and the son-in-law 
of a land investor with very similar land interests to the appellee in this matter (descendants of appellee 
had acquired land via forged authorizations of the British Crown in direct contravention of the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, forbidding expansion into the unchartered land West of the present-day 
Appalachian Mountains).  Since the Crown refused to recognize acquisitions predicated forged Royal 
authorization, Harper was hired to “set up” a case in which he would argue that direct purchase from the 
Native Americans in the area was more legitimate than title acquired under the rule of the Crown.  To 
help facilitate a favorable outcome, Echo-Hawk explains that Harper negotiated with M’Intosh, who had 
acquired title from the U.S. (which had acquired title from the crown), to serve as the defendant in a 
“losing” case.  The assumption being that Chief Justice Marshall would validate purchases of land 
directly from the tribes, over title derived from Royal conquest. 
 13. Id. at 73. 
 14. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 588-91; ECHO-HAWK, supra note 12, at 73. 
 15. See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 587; ECHO-HAWK, supra note 12, at 73. 
 16. See ECHO-HAWK, supra note 12, at 73. 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. The Non-Intercourse Act, detailed infra, was purposed by Congress to govern all discourse 
between the tribes and non-native citizens in America.  The Act’s most basic function was to provide to 
Congress the exclusive authority to transact land sales with the tribes.  Under the auspices of the Act, no 
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Traditionally, the story of European conquest begins in the fateful year of 1492 
when the Spanish Crown commissioned Christopher Columbus’s explorations 
aimed at mapping a westward sea route to the East Indies—an excursion that would 
ultimately lead to the slaughter, disease, enslavement, and torture of some twelve 
million Native people throughout the Americas.20  Throughout the nearly three 
centuries leading up to the American Revolution, the Native Americans who lived 
in North America transacted, traded, cohabitated, and fought with the European 
powers who established colonial outposts in the “New World.”21  However, in the 
year 1763, the English King, George III, perceived a need to quell rising tensions 
between the tribal nations and private landowners throughout the colonies; in an 
effort to remedy the quarrelsome and disjointed approach to tribal land acquisition 
at the time, King George issued the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which provided 
structure to European interactions with Native Americans concerning land 
transactions.22  Under this decree, the English King forbade his countrymen (and by 
the doctrine of discovery, all other European settlers) from purchasing “Indian 
Land” from a “forbidden zone beyond the Allegheny Mountains,” west of the area 
marked today by the Appalachian Trail.23  The effect of this proclamation was that 
“British law [now] barred the purchase of Indian Land in the forbidden zone by 
anyone but the Crown.”24  The Royal Proclamation of 1763 remained in effect until 
the United States became an independent nation following the Revolutionary 
War.25   
Several decades later, at the behest of newly-appointed Secretary of War and 
Maine-native, Henry Knox, the United States enacted the Non-Intercourse Act of 
1790.26  When Knox originally proposed the Act to President George Washington, 
he did so out of concern that relations between the states and many tribes were 
rapidly deteriorating—the result of ongoing confrontation and multiple treaties 
which had been signed between the states and the tribes, and which acted to 
unfairly dispossess the tribes of large swaths of land.27  Seeking to avoid plunging 
the new nation and the tribes into a war not of the central government’s “own 
choosing,” Knox suggested that the tribes be treated as separate, sovereign nations 
and that no individual state or citizen be allowed to transact with them.28  Heeding 
Knox’s advice, Washington used his influence to induce congressional action on 
                                                                                                     
land transaction with any tribe, by any state or private citizen, was legally valid unless ratified by 
Congress.  25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012). 
 20. See ECHO-HAWK, supra note 12, at 15. 
 21. See generally WILBUR R. JACOBS, DISPOSSESSING THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1972); PAULEENA 
MACDOUGALL, THE PENOBSCOT DANCE OF RESISTANCE: TRADITION IN THE HISTORY OF A PEOPLE 
(2004). 
 22. See ECHO-HAWK, supra note 12, at 62-63. 
 23. Id. at 62. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Some historians argue that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 remains good law in Canada, given 
that no law has formally overturned it.  Victory in the Revolutionary War, and detachment from British 
rule formally quashed the document’s application in the United States in 1776.  Royal Proclamation, 
1763, INDIGENOUS FOUNDS., http://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/home/government-policy/royal-
proclamation-1763.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2014).  
 26. See ROLDE, supra note 6, at 22-24. 
 27. See id. at 23. 
 28. Id. 
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the matter, and after a year, Congress responded by enacting the Non-Intercourse 
Act on July 22, 1790.29 
In effect, the Non-Intercourse Act of 1790 stipulated that the sale or exchange 
of lands held by Native American tribes, nations, or any members thereof, to 
individuals or states, without being executed under the authority of the United 
States (Congress), was null and void ab initio, and had no “validity in law or 
equity.”30  Thus, the Act granted Congress exclusive, unfettered authority to permit 
or deny the sale or exchange of any Native American land.31  Although the original 
purpose of the 1790 Act may have been as Henry Knox intended (i.e., to steer the 
nation away from state-induced warfare with the tribal confederacies), the effect 
was to require Native Americans and third parties to obtain Congressional approval 
in order to be awarded valid legal status for all subsequent land transactions.  
Though unforeseen at the time, this unequivocal provision would subsequently 
become the legal foundation upon which Native Americans in Maine would assert 
the largest, most groundbreaking land claims the world had ever seen, challenging 
the legitimacy of Maine’s title to more than two-thirds of its state territory. 
B.  Brief History of Tribal Land Transactions in Massachusetts and Maine 
Between the summers of 1794 and 1796, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
had contained its own so-called “Indian problem” by negotiating and signing 
treaties with the Passamaquoddy, Penobscot, and Maliseet people living in the 
northern district of the Commonwealth (what is present-day Maine).32  In 
September 1794, the Passamaquoddy and the Maliseet—responding to growing 
concerns within the tribes that they would be left vulnerable to attack by the British 
(stationed in nearby New Brunswick and Nova Scotia) after allying themselves 
with the Americans during the Revolutionary War—entered into a treaty with the 
state of Massachusetts.33  Under the terms of the 1794 treaty, the tribes agreed to 
relinquish all legal rights, claims, interests, and title in their land located in the 
northern district of the Commonwealth in exchange for 23,000 acres of reserved 
land, plus numerous small islands and tracts of land scattered about present-day 
Pleasant Point, Maine.34 
The Commonwealth negotiated a similar agreement with the Penobscot Tribe 
two years later, in August of 1796.35  Worn and weary from ongoing post-
Revolutionary warfare with the lingering British presence in Penobscot Bay and the 
surrounding land area, the Penobscot Tribe suffered from an “impoverished state” 
of existence.36  Using this to their advantage, the Commonwealth approached the 
chiefs of the Penobscot people to enter into a treaty similar to that signed by the 
Passamaquoddy and the Maliseet, two years earlier.37  Though the Penobscot chiefs 
                                                                                                     
 29. Id. 
 30. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012).  See also ROLDE, supra note 6, at 20, 24. 
 31. See ROLDE, supra note 6, at 20, 24. 
 32. See MACDOUGALL, supra note 21, at 112; ROLDE, supra note 6, at 15. 
 33. See ROLDE, supra note 6, at 13-14. 
 34. Id. at 15. 
 35. See MACDOUGALL, supra note 21, at 112. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. 
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had long refused to negotiate settlement with the Commonwealth in exchange 
assurances of American allegiance,38 they were unable to resist the competing and 
equally destructive forces of American encroachment of tribal lands to the South 
and West, as well as intermittent skirmishes with the British who patrolled 
Penobscot Bay and the surrounding area.  As a result, the chiefs of the Penobscot 
Tribe agreed to a treaty, similar in scope to the treaty signed by the neighboring 
Passamaquoddy and Maliseet in 1794.39  
The “resources” acquired by the Penobscot in exchange for nearly all of their 
land were not sufficient to sustain the tribe’s existence for any extended period of 
time.40  As a result, the Tribe was again in dire straits, and, by the year 1818, the 
Penobscot again sold portions of what little remaining land they had (ceding to 
Massachusetts all of their islands in the Penobscot River north of Indian Island in 
Old Town, as well as four six-square-mile townships purposed for the production 
of sustainable timber harvesting) in exchange for basic necessities and foodstuffs.41 
When Maine gained statehood in 1820, it continued to perpetuate the 
colonialist policies of Massachusetts; in 1833 Maine negotiated with the desperate 
and increasingly disenfranchised tribes to “purchase” four more townships from the 
Penobscot for a mere “fifty thousand dollars in a fraudulent transaction involving 
forged signatures.”42  These types of treaties—in which the State acquired large 
parcels of tribal lands (reserved to the tribes by the treaties of 1794 and 1796)—
continued to occur until the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and Maliseet people were 
relegated to miniscule reservations located at Indian Island, Princeton/Pleasant 
Point, and Houlton, respectively.43   
The Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and Maliseet people, once free to inhabit and 
draw sustenance from all of Maine’s lands, had been evicted to a handful of 
cloistered, segregated towns and territories.  Although the Native people in Maine 
had proven their resilience by retaining their cultural identity and tribal 
sovereignty, true resistance to Maine’s colonialist policies would lie dormant in the 
hearts of the tribes until the revelation that the land transfers of 1794, 1796, and 
those of the early-mid 1800’s had not been ratified by Congress pursuant to the 
Non-Intercourse Act of 1790 and were thus invalid from their inception.  This 
revelation gave way to the land claims issue of the 1970’s.44 
                                                                                                     
 38. See id. at 100-12. 
 39. See id. at 112.  As a result, the Penobscot agreed to release all land claims in the northern 
district of Massachusetts (present-day Maine) that fell below Old Town Island (nearly two-hundred 
thousand acres), except for the islands themselves; as compensation, the Commonwealth provided the 
Penobscot with “one-hundred and fifty yards of cloth for blankets, four hundred pounds of shot, a 
hundred pounds of powder, a hundred bushels of corn, thirteen bushels of salts, thirty-six hats, a barrel 
of rum and the promise of an annual stipend consisting of similar items.”  PAUL BRODEUR, 
RESTITUTION: THE LAND CLAIMS OF THE MASHPEE, PASSAMAQUODDY, AND PENOBSCOT INDIANS OF 
NEW ENGLAND 78 (1985). 
 40. See BRODEUR, supra note 39, at 78. 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id.  
 44. See ROLDE, supra note 6, at 20. 
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C. Road to Restitution?: Paving the Path for the Maine Indian Land Claims 
In 1964, a land dispute between members of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and a 
Maine citizen named William Plaisted precipitated a legal journey that would give 
rise to the Maine Indian Land Claims.45  In the winter of that year, men hired by 
Plaisted began clear-cutting several acres of land on the edge of Lewey’s Lake 
(near Indian Township) when several Passamaquoddy tribe members (who had not 
heard of any government-approved sale of the land) confronted them.46  
Eventually, the Passamaquoddies’ suspicions that Plaisted had improperly acquired 
title to the lands were confirmed when Plaisted asserted that he had won title to the 
land from a non-tribal member in a poker game.47  Upon discovery of Plaisted’s 
illegal acquisition, the Passamaquoddy notified state officials, but the State failed 
to provide a remedy to the Tribe.48  In response, the Passamaquoddy hired a Maine 
attorney named Don Gellers.  Gellers advanced the theory that the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts had violated the trust into which reservation lands had been 
placed for the Passamaquoddy under the Treaty of 1794.49  Gellers brought suit on 
behalf of the Passamaquoddy against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and not 
against the State of Maine, because Maine had not waived its sovereign immunity 
and therefore was immune from suit without its consent, unless sued by the federal 
government or another state.50  Gellers theorized that the Tribe could sue 
Massachusetts for reparations for violation of the Treaty of 1794, and that 
Massachusetts, in turn, would sue Maine for allowing Plaisted’s acquisition of 
Passamaquoddy reservation land, thereby circumventing the obstacle posed by 
Maine’s sovereign immunity.51  Gellers ultimately sought, on behalf of the Tribe, 
one hundred and fifty million dollars as compensation for violation of the 1794 
agreement.52 
The Passamaquoddies’ suit was interrupted when, in 1968, Gellers was forced 
to withdraw as counsel for personal reasons and the Tribe was once again without 
representation.53  This changed in 1971 when the Tribe hired Thomas Tureen, a 
young attorney practicing in Calais, Maine who, at the time, was employed by the 
Indian Legal Services Unit of Pine Tree Legal Assistance.54  It was Tureen, with 
the help of Francis O’Toole, a student at the University of Maine School of Law 
and editor-in-chief of the Maine Law Review, who advanced the simple but 
winning argument that neither the 1794 nor the 1796 treaties signed by the tribes 
were valid because the treaties had not been congressionally approved pursuant to 
                                                                                                     
 45. See id. at 10; BRODEUR, supra note 39, at 69. 
 46. See BRODEUR, supra note 39, at 69. 
 47. Id. at 71. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. at 81. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See ROLDE, supra note 6, at 17-18.  Specifically, Gellers and a colleague were arrested for 
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his tenure as legal counsel for the Passamaquoddy.  
 54. BRODEUR, supra note 39, at 81-82. 
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the Non-Intercourse Act of 1790.55 
Soon after the Passamaquoddy hired Tureen, news of his theory of the case 
spread to the Penobscot and Maliseet tribes, who joined the Passamaquoddy in 
seeking compensation, through a settlement, for lands amounting to nearly two-
thirds of Maine’s total landmass and carrying a collective value of nearly twenty-
five billion dollars.56  To address the same sovereign immunity issue faced by 
Gellers, Tureen sought to induce the federal government to sue the State of Maine 
on behalf of the tribes by petitioning the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), thus 
circumventing the sovereign immunity deadlock.57  Tureen’s petition went without 
a reply for nearly five months—largely due to uncertainty at the BIA as to whether 
the Non-Intercourse Act even applied to the Eastern tribes, and Bureau’s growing 
concerns as to the possible ramifications of such a monumental suit.58  
Faced with a statute of limitations enacted by Congress in 1964 that estopped 
Indian Land claims from being brought after 1972, Tureen petitioned the Federal 
District Court, and argued to Judge Edward Gignoux that the question of whether 
or not the Non-Intercourse Act applied to the tribes in question was a “live 
justiciable controversy” under the Administrative Procedure Act.59  Judge Gignoux 
agreed and ordered the Department of Justice to file claims for one hundred and 
fifty million dollars in reparations and damages on behalf of both the 
Passamaquoddy and Penobscot tribes, affirmatively eliminating the statute of 
limitations issue.60  In 1975, Judge Gignoux heard the case in earnest and ruled that 
the Non-Intercourse Act of 1790 did in fact apply to the Maine tribes.61  
Consequently, Judge Gignoux ordered the Justice Department to file suit on behalf 
of the tribes against the State of Maine “as the heir to Massachusetts’s 
responsibility.”62  
Thus, the native people who had inhabited the lands of present-day Maine 
since Gluskabe created the first village on the Penobscot River, would finally have 
their voices heard as a result of federal recognition of the legitimacy of the Maine 
Indian Land Claims. 
III. SETTLEMENT OF THE MAINE INDIAN LAND CLAIMS  
A. Striking a “Bargain”: Negotiations, Prejudices, and the Cultivation of a 
Settlement 
It is of no surprise, given the political magnitude and potential, negative 
repercussions faced by the State, that the instinctive response of many Maine 
politicians to the land claims was to deny their legitimacy, despite federal 
recognition.  At the time, the two strongest opponents of the legitimacy of the tribal 
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land claims were newly-elected Governor James B. Longley and State Attorney 
General Joseph E. Brennan (who would succeed Longley as governor in 1978)— 
both expressed hearty disregard for the land claims issue by initially refusing to 
take political action on the matter.63  
State leaders, however, were no longer able to turn a blind-eye to the gravity of 
the situation when, in 1976, Boston-based law firm, Ropes and Gray, “[announced] 
that it would no longer be able to give unqualified approval to municipal bonds 
issued within the disputed area.”64  Ropes and Gray was unwilling to provide bond 
ratings for lands for which true title was ambiguous, as a result of the land claims 
concerning over two-thirds of Maine’s sovereign territory.65  As a result, 
municipalities and the Maine Municipal Bond Bank were frozen in their efforts to 
liquidate bonds to fund the capital investments of Maine towns and cities.66  
Although the fiscal gridlock posed a significant funding dilemma for Maine 
municipalities and financial institutions, the reactions of Maine homeowners most 
deeply shook the political and economic landscape.   With over 350,000 non-tribal 
Maine residences and multiple, large-scale paper and timber companies implicated 
in the estimated twelve and one-half million acres comprising the tribal claims 
area, many Mainers feared that it would “soon . . . [be] impossible to transfer real 
estate or get mortgages[,]” and that affected businesses would be deprived of 
access to necessary capital resources.67  For his part in the matter, Governor 
Longley made several public appearances, including a trip to Washington D.C., 
calling for a federal blockade of the tribal claims in the courts; demanding that 
claims be limited to monetary damages (equal to the fair market value of the 
disputed lands as they existed in the late eighteenth century); and publicly 
politicizing the “threat” that the land claims posed to Maine homes (although the 
tribes specifically and “repeatedly stated that they had no intention of taking 
anyone’s home”).68 
                                                                                                     
 63. See ROLDE, supra note 6, at 29-38.  Specifically, Rolde notes the extent to which neither man 
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spending was halted by the Ropes and Gray crisis).  See also BRODEUR, supra note 39, at 97.  
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after the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, in ENDURING LEGACIES: NATIVE AMERICAN 
TREATIES AND CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 25, 29 (Bruce E. Johansen ed., 2004). 
 68. BRODEUR, supra note 39, at 97; see Proposed Settlement of the Maine Indian Claims 
Settlement: Public Hearing on the Proposed Maine Indian Claim Settlement Before the Joint Select 
Committee, 109th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. 23-27 (Mar. 28, 1980) reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE MAINE INDIAN LAND CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT (Me. State Law & Legis. Reference Library ed., 
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As a show of good faith to assuage the rising concerns of the general citizenry, 
the tribes offered, in February of 1977, to drop their claims to two million acres of 
heavily-populated coastal territory in exchange for the federally-guaranteed right to 
sue either Maine or Massachusetts for the present-day fair market value of the land, 
plus trespass damages.69  The tribes also offered not to pursue any claim against a 
private homeowner or small-property owner in the State.70  Maine’s congressional 
delegation responded by introducing identical bills in the House and Senate seeking 
to “extinguish all aboriginal title that might be held by the [Maine] tribes and to 
limit to monetary damages any claim that the Indians might bring.”71  The impasse, 
created by the State’s “all or nothing” approach and refusal to negotiate, was soon 
broken however, when President Jimmy Carter intervened—expressing support 
that the matter be negotiated, not extinguished—and appointed retiring Georgia 
Supreme Court Justice, William B. Gunter, as his special representative to mediate 
and evaluate the claims.72 
Negotiations moderated by Judge Gunter proved to be fruitless when the    
judge insisted that the matter not go to trial, urging instead that the federal 
government pay the tribes $25 million in damages; secure on their behalf some 
100,000 acres of reservation lands; and make available for purchase by the tribes as 
trust lands another 400,000 acres of Maine land.73  Neither side found the terms 
agreeable.74  Seeking to resolve the issue once and for all, President Carter 
appointed a three-member negotiating team to reach an agreement with the tribes; 
the team members included: Eliot Cutler, an ex-aide to Senator Edmund Muskie; 
Leo Krulitz, an attorney with the Department of the Interior; and A. Stephens Clay, 
an attorney from D.C. and an associate in Gunter’s private practice.75 
The negotiation team’s discourse with the tribes resulted in a proposed 
settlement agreement that promised the tribes $30 million in restitution; federally-
guaranteed acquisition of 500,000 acres of protected trust lands; a $1.7 million 
annual federal stipend; and the requirement that fourteen large landowners, 
consisting primarily of paper companies, sell to the tribes some 300,000 acres of 
contested forest lands (valued at $112.50 per acre) for $5.00 per acre.76  Given the 
absence of Maine legislators on the presidentially-appointed negotiation team, 
public outcry was sharp; many Mainers perceived the deal to be unfair, and some 
(likely provoked “by Governor Longley’s fiery rhetoric”) took their paranoia and 
outrage a step further, as “[g]unshops were emptied of weapons” in preparation for 
a land war that the tribes had neither threatened, nor desired.77 
With tempers raging and portions of the State on the verge of social collapse, 
Governor Longley and Attorney General Brennan agreed to negotiate with the 
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tribes in an effort to reach a settlement and put the issue to rest.78  Over the next 
two years, the State and the tribes exchanged figures and debated the relationship 
that would be forged, moving forward, between the tribes and the State.  On March 
28, 1980—after the present-day terms of MICSA had been agreed to and 
implemented in the final bill—a public hearing was held at the Augusta Civic 
Center to which numerous tribal members from the three tribes impacted by 
MICSA, as well as others from around New England, were invited.79  The tribal 
members, some twenty-one in number, were told they would be allowed to speak 
following the afternoon recess.80  Upon returning from break, the Joint Select 
Committee of the Maine Legislature heard the public opinion of these tribal 
members, and many others.  The resounding message from the tribes was 
unanimous: MICSA was a bad deal; MICSA had been rushed; MICSA had not 
been subject to an acceptable, minimum quorum of non-representative tribal 
members for general tribal approval; and MICSA unduly limited tribal 
sovereignty.81 In the heat of a land claims issue that the State had already postured 
so as to reap grossly disproportionate benefits, it had also sought to limit tribal 
sovereignty. 
In the end, fear drove acceptance of MICSA as a viable solution to the land 
claims issue.  Specifically, the State feared that, if the case did not settle, the tribes 
would enjoy a resounding victory in the federal courts, thereby stripping Maine of 
significant portions of its territory, and causing economic and political 
devastation.82  In opposite but equal measure, the  tribes feared that if presidential 
candidate Ronald Reagan was elected, he would make good on his promise to 
exterminate their federal claims altogether, which compelled them to settle under 
the purview of the Carter administration, perceived to be more supportive of their 
cause.83  As such, on October 10th, President Carter signed into law MICSA as it 
exists today, and in December of that year, finalized the requisite appropriations 
bill that would fund MICSA.84  After gaining congressional approval, MICSA 
became the first legitimately settled major land transaction between the Maine 
tribes and the State to be legitimately settled within the boundaries of the Non-
Intercourse Act of 1790. 
The Maine Indian Land Claims that had captivated the attention and aroused 
the fears of millions of Americans across the country and throughout the State of 
Maine had come to a close.  Despite the inequity at play behind the legally invalid 
treaties signed during the warm summer months of the mid-1790s, the 
Passamaquoddy, Penobscot, and Maliseet had succumbed to perhaps the most 
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unjust “compromise” yet struck with the federal and state governments.85  If 
settlement under MICSA could be called a victory in any sense of the word, it was 
surely a pyrrhic victory, and nothing more.  In exchange for a comparatively paltry 
monetary settlement, the tribes surrendered a right perhaps more sacred than title to 
ancestral lands: unfettered tribal sovereignty. 
B. The Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act 86 
MICSA details numerous aspects of tribal-state relations, and sets forth the 
regulatory parameters by which each entity is permitted to act with regard to the 
other.  Specifically, MICSA sets forth the powers and limitations of the tribes and 
the State in regard to a wide variety of social, political, and environmental issues 
ranging from the authority to levy and collect taxes;87 to regulation of fish and 
wildlife88 and the establishment of a Tribal School Board;89 to tribal eligibility for 
State funding.90  However, the primary effect of MICSA has been channeled by 
two provisions in particular, each bearing negatively on the tribes.  
First, MICSA details the settlement-exchange of lands, from the tribes to the 
State of Maine.91  In exchange for title to tribal lands, the State awarded the tribes 
monetary damages and developed a structure for regulating tribal lands under the 
Act.92  This structure, as delineated in section 6205 of MICSA, defines the two 
ways in which tribal lands may be held: in reservation and in trust.93   
Second, the Act defines the legal status of the tribe as a functional 
municipality94—a provision that, although perhaps facially unassuming, has had a 
deeply devastating effect on tribal sovereignty as interpreted by the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court (Law Court).  Before analyzing the effects of MICSA, however, this 
comment will briefly examine the Act’s integral components. 
1. Section 6205: Indian Territory 
Pursuant to MICSA, the tribes retained title in a few, limited portions of the 
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State, as detailed under section 6205 of the Act, entitled “Indian Territory”.95  By 
explicitly naming those lands reserved to and placed in trust for the tribes, MICSA 
impliedly vests title in the State for the remainder of disputed lands.  Although 
section 6205’s apparent function is to serve as the means by which Maine quieted 
title to the majority of its present-day territory, it also serves an often over-looked 
ancillary purpose: it acknowledges the tribes’ status as special municipalities.96  
Particularly, section 6205 specifically establishes and treats the tribal land holdings 
as special, distinguishing the Maine tribes from the status afforded to them under 
section 6206—that of municipalities.97  Section 6205 is of significant importance to 
the landscape of MICSA case law because it establishes a clear fiduciary 
relationship between the tribes and the Secretary of the Interior and Bureau Affairs 
in governing the administration of tribal land holdings and acquisition.98 
Under section 6205, two distinct types of land ownership are established for 
the Maine tribes: reservation and trust lands.99  Former Tribal Representative to the 
Maine State Legislature and Penobscot Nation member, Donna Loring, best 
articulates the operative effect of section 6205:  
Our tribes hold land in several different ways. Our reservation lands are original 
homelands that we have never given up. They are protected by the federal 
government. We don’t pay taxes in any form on our reservation land or land that 
we have placed in trust (both known as Indian Territory). Reservation land and 
trust land can’t be sold outside of the tribe or alienated in any way from the tribe. 
In addition, the tribes have acquired land bought with the Land Claims Settlement 
Act money or other funds, and unless it is converted to trust land, the tribes pay 
state taxes on it and often municipal taxes, too. This is land they can sell, unless 
they put it into trust.100 
Section 6205 details those lands, particular to each tribe, that are defined as 
“Indian territory” for the purposes of the Act.101  Tribal territory is articulated 
separately for each tribe.102  Specific to the Passamaquoddy, section 6205(1)(A) 
“reserves” to the Tribe the Passamaquoddy Indian Reservation lands originally 
reserved to the them under the agreement of 1794, as detailed by section 6203(5) of 
the Act.103  Additionally, section 6205(1)(B), provides that:  
The first 150,000 acres of land acquired by the secretary for the benefit of the 
Passamaquoddy Tribe from [a detailed list of pre-determined parcels in 
unincorporated northern territories] to the extent that those lands are acquired . . .  
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prior to January 31, 1991, are not held in common with any other person or entity 
and are certified by the secretary by January 31, 1991, as held for the benefit for 
the Passamaquoddy Tribe.104 
As detailed by former-Representative Loring, any lands not purchased by the 
tribes in compliance with the deadlines and specific limitations set forth in MICSA 
may still be transacted, but are first subject to the approval of the Maine Indian 
Tribal-State Commission (an advisory body established under MICSA to uphold its 
provisions) and then must survive the legislative process, enacted into law as an 
amendment to the Act.105 
MICSA’s definition of lands reserved to, and held in trust for, the Penobscot 
Tribe is similar to that of the Passamaquoddy.106  Collectively, the lands retained 
(and available for purchase as trust lands) by the Maine tribes following the 
enactment of MICSA are depicted in Appendix B. 
After delineating the official tribal territory boundaries, section 6205 examines 
state and federal takings policies with regard to both tribal reservation lands and 
tribal territory. Takings of reservations lands are heavily restricted.107 Takings of 
non-reservation tribal territory are treated similarly, but are slightly less restricted 
where a public entity seeks to affect a taking for a public utility.108 
Lastly, section 6205(5) details the limitations placed on the tribes’ ability to 
incorporate into tribal territory any lands acquired by the tribes after the enactment 
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 108. See id. § 6205(3)(B).  Under section 6205(3)(B), a public entity or the Public Utilities 
Commission may affect a taking of non-reservation tribal territory for the same purpose and under the 
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of MICSA.109  Specifically, section 6205(5) forbids the addition of any non-section 
6205(1)-(4) land to tribal territory without both the recommendation of the Maine 
Indian Tribal-State Commission and approval of the State.110 
Having established the framework for the apportionment and regulation of 
tribal lands in section 6205, MICSA proceeds to define the powers, duties, and 
sovereign status of the tribes in section 6206.  
2. Section 6206: Powers and Duties of the Indian Tribes Within Their Respective 
Indian Territories 
The critical loss suffered by the tribes under MICSA stems from the 
ambiguous language of section 6206, particularly as it has been interpreted by the 
Law Court.  Specifically, section 6206’s ambiguous use of the phrase “internal 
tribal matters” has been interpreted by the Law Court as providing the judiciary 
with license to construe tribal activities as “sufficiently internal” on a continuum 
ranging from broad inclusions to narrow exclusions.  Unfortunately, narrow 
interpretations of section 6206’s “internal tribal matters” language have led to 
egregious limitations of tribal sovereignty, despite the tribes’ qualified municipal 
status under MICSA. 
Although settlement and concession of nearly all of the original lands claimed 
by the tribes (and invalidly held by the State) was the primary objective behind the 
enactment of MICSA, Maine officials were also concerned about the jurisdictional 
authority the tribes would have over their reservation and trust lands.111  Indeed, in 
the months leading up to the settlement and enactment of MICSA, Maine Attorney 
General Richard Cohen expressed as “intolerable” the possibility that the State 
would be “unable to enforce [its laws on tribal] lands.”112  In response to the State’s 
concern of creating “a nation within a nation” (as seen through the heightened 
sovereignty afforded to a large number of western tribes), the State conditioned its 
approval of MICSA on the inclusion of section 6206.113 
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criminal activities conducted on Indian lands—as memorialized in South Dakota’s State Constitution; 
the state of Oregon has recognized the economic importance of gaming to tribes within its borders and 
permits the establishment of casinos and gaming centers on tribal reservation lands; the state of 
Washington recognizes tribal corporations owned by tribal governments and constructed under tribal 
laws as immune from suit; and Colorado and Montana have already begun transitioning ownership and 
regulation of hydroelectric dams to local tribal authorities.  Although perhaps less pervasive at the time 
of MICSA’s inception, western trends in recognizing greater levels of tribal sovereignty and autonomy 
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Section 6206 governs the legal, political, and governmental sovereignty of the 
Maine tribes.114  Divided into three subparts, section 6206 details: the general 
powers of the tribes; the tribes’ power to sue and be sued; and the tribes’ power to 
enact and enforce tribal ordinances.115  Of greatest significance to the contemporary 
limitations placed upon the tribes is perhaps section 6206(1), which defines the 
tribes’ sovereign status as equivalent to a state municipality.116 
The language of section 6206(1) provides that:  
[T]he [tribes], within their respective Indian territories, shall have, exercise and 
enjoy all the rights, privileges, powers and immunities . . . of a municipality of and 
subject to the laws of the State, provided, however, that internal tribal matters . . . 
shall not be subject to regulation by the State.117 
In effect, section 6206 confers upon the tribes a reduced sovereign status from 
that which they enjoyed prior to the enactment of MICSA.  Under the municipality 
model, the Maine tribes are no longer considered fully sovereign nations, but are 
instead limited to the authority possessed by Maine municipalities except where 
internal tribal matters are concerned.118  As a result of the internal tribal matters 
exception and other regulatory authority enjoyed by the tribes (but not general 
municipalities), MICSA renders the tribes a quasi-municipality status.119  In other 
words, under MICSA, the once-sovereign nations that formed the Wabanaki 
Confederacy are treated as the functional equivalents of a Maine town or city, 
except with regard to internal tribal matters.  
Though the legislative intent behind section 6206 is clear, its language is 
ambiguous.120  Because neither MICSA nor its legislative history describe exactly 
how to interpret the ambiguous “internal tribal matters” language of section 6206, 
that task has fallen to the Law Court which has applied a narrow construction of the 
language on multiple occasions, while at other times construing it more broadly.  
The Law Court’s inconsistent precedent interpreting the critical “internal tribal 
matters” language in section 6206, both broadly and narrowly, may have fairly 
                                                                                                     
were not unknown and, to date, have produced favorable results for the tribes in conjunction with 
legitimate state interests.  See Gabriel S. Galanda, Washington Court Gets it “Wright”—Upholds 
Immunity for Tribal Corporations, INDIAN GAMING, http://www.indiangaming.com/ 
regulatory/view/?id=51 (last visited Feb. 6, 2014); Marci Krivonen, Tribes in Western U.S. Use Water to 
Assert Sovereignty, ASPEN PUB. RADIO (July 15, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://aspenpublicradio.org/post/ 
tribes-western-us-use-water-assert-sovereignty; Letter from John Yellow Bird Steele, President of the 
Ogala Sioux Tribe, to Tracie L. Stevens, Chairwoman of the Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n 2 (Feb. 1, 
2001), available at http://www.nigc.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=tZ1zc5-SXL8%3D&tabid=992; 
Richard Townsend, Indian Sovereignty in Oregon 14 (Aug. 2003), available at 
http://www.klamathbasincrisis.org/tribes/IndianSovereigntyOregon.pdf.   
 114. See 30 M.R.S.A. § 6206. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. § 6206(1). 
 117. Id. (emphasis added). 
 118. See id. 
 119. Proposed Settlement of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement: Public Hearing on the Proposed 
Maine Indian Claim Settlement Before the Joint Select Committee, 109th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. 5-6 (Mar. 
28, 1980) reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MAINE INDIAN LAND CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT 
(Me. State Law & Legis. Reference Library ed., 2008). 
 120. See generally id. 
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resolved those cases that were before the Court, but it has left unresolved the 
appropriate scope of tribal autonomy that should be afforded to Maine’s tribal 
entities, vis-à-vis the State, within the boundaries of MICSA. 
In short, critical questions remain as to whether the historical denigration of 
tribal identity and sovereignty in Maine will continue, or whether a more generous 
conception of tribal sovereignty may be fashioned within the boundaries of 
MICSA. 
IV.   MAINE’S COLONIALIST LEGACY: A CRITIQUE OF MICSA AMBIGUITY AND THE 
RESULTING LIMITATIONS PLACED ON MEANINGFUL TRIBAL AUTONOMY 
“Since Maine became a state in 1820, it has tried to make us disappear—
 and, when that didn’t happen, it chose to make us invisible.” 
—Donna Loring, former Tribal Representative121 
A. Navigating MICSA’s Ambiguous “Internal Tribal Matters” Language: An ‘All-
or-Nothing’ Discourse  
Under the MICSA regime, it is undisputed that Maine tribes may not make a 
legal claim to complete sovereign immunity as a result of their quasi-sovereign, 
quasi-municipal status; however, determining whether tribal activity is “internal” 
(and thus immune from state interference) continues to be disputed.  Despite 
MICSA’s clarity in rendering a quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal status upon the 
tribes, the Act is silent on what constitutes an “internal tribal matter” for the 
purposes of exclusion from State inference with a given tribal activity.122 As a 
result of this ambiguity, MICSA, as noted, effectively creates a void within which 
the Law Court has been pressed to interpret the scope of the “internal tribal 
matters” question.  The Court’s adoption of both broad and narrow interpretations 
of MICSA may be traced to the posturing of specific cases before it and the 
ambiguity inherent in the Act.  Of concern, however, is the threat that a narrow 
construction of MICSA poses to the future of permissible tribal autonomy within 
the boundaries of the tribes’ designated quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal status. 
The Law Court has decided a limited number of cases which directly address 
the ambiguous “internal tribal matters” language in section 6206.123 The collective 
effect of the case law concerning MICSA’s “internal tribal matters” question is 
two-fold. Cases that construe the language broadly permit autonomous tribal 
decision-making;124 whereas cases that construe the language narrowly constrict 
tribal decision-making.125  This dichotomy is fashioned in an “all-or-nothing” 
                                                                                                     
 121. LORING, supra note 100, at 11. 
 122. See 30 M.R.S.A. § 6206(1). 
 123. See Tomer v. Maine Human Rights Comm'n, 2008 ME 190, 962 A.2d 335; Francis v. Dana-
Cummings, 2008 ME 184, 962 A.2d 944; Winifred B. French Corp. v. Pleasant Point Passamaquoddy 
Reservation, 2006 ME 53, 896 A.2d 950; Great N. Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Nation, 2001 ME 68, 770 
A.2d 574; Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians v. Boyce, 1997 ME 4, 688 A.2d 908; Penobscot Nation v. 
Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478 (Me. 1983). 
 124. See, e.g., Boyce, 1997 ME 4, 688 A.2d 908; Winifred B. French Corp., 2006 ME 53, 896 A.2d 
950; Dana-Cummings, 2008 ME 184, 962 A.2d 944; Tomer, 2008 ME 190, 962 A.2d 335. 
 125. See, e.g., Great N. Paper, Inc., 2001 ME 68, ¶¶ 51-63, 770 A.2d 574; Stilphen, 461 A.2d at 489-
90. 
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manner and construes tribal activities as either entirely internal (affecting no 
external entity) and thus permitted, or external (affecting some larger state interest) 
and thus impermissible.  The effect of this dichotomy is troublesome because it 
does not allow the Law Court to view section 6206 in varying “shades of gray,” as 
it should.  Interpreting section 6206 in a sweeping “black and white” 
internal/external manner neglects the importance of giving deference to tribal 
autonomy that is consistent with legitimate, far-reaching state interests, to the 
fullest extent permissible under the quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal status 
established under the Act. 
This dichotomy also suffers from the fact that the Law Court has addressed 
only a limited number of cases that have presented the “internal tribal matters” 
issue.  As a result, the Court has been compelled to construe the Act narrowly 
because of the particular posture of the case before it.126  When examined in light 
of this consideration, the unsettled precedents of MICSA case law are both 
understandable and also provide an opportunity for the Law Court to definitively 
establish a broader interpretative standard—one that it has adopted in more recent 
decisions.127 
B.  Applying Section 6206: The Maine Law Court’s Interpretation of Section 
6206’s Ambiguous “Internal Tribal Matters” Language  
From 1983 to 2008, the Law Court has interpreted and applied section 6206 in 
six cases.128  The court adopted a narrow interpretation of section 6206 in two of 
these cases.129  As noted, the effect of these interpretations is troublesome because 
they limit the permissible scope of tribal autonomy. 
The first case that arose from this line of decisions was Penobscot Nation v. 
Stilphen.130  At issue in Stilphen was the legality of tribal beano games that, 
although held solely on tribal reservation lands of the Penobscot Tribe, conflicted 
with Maine’s general prohibition against beano games operated without licensure 
issued by the Chief of the State Police.131  Though acknowledging that it fell under 
none of the specifically-allowed entities to whom the Chief of Police was permitted 
to issue a valid beano license, the Tribe argued that the activity in question 
constituted an ‘internal tribal matter’ under section 6206 of MICSA because 
proceeds from beano gaming were being appropriated to fund their tribal 
government.132  In interpreting MICSA’s ambiguous language in section 6206(1), 
                                                                                                     
 126. See, e.g., Great N. Paper, Inc., 2001 ME 68, ¶¶ 51-63, Stilphen, 461 A.2d at 490.  
 127. See, e.g., Tomer, 2008 ME 190, 962 A.2d 335; Dana-Cummings, 2008 ME 184, 962 A.2d 944; 
Winifred B. French Corp., 2006 ME 53, 896 A.2d 950. 
 128. Tomer, 2008 ME 190, 962 A.2d 335; Dana-Cummings, 2008 ME 184, 962 A.2d 944; Winifred 
B. French Corp., 2006 ME 53, 896 A.2d 950; Great N. Paper, Inc., 2001 ME 68, 770 A.2d 574; Boyce, 
1997 ME 4, 688 A.2d 908; Stilphen, 461 A.2d at 490. 
 129. See Great N. Paper, Inc., 2001 ME 68, 770 A.2d 574; Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478. 
 130. 461 A.2d 478. 
 131. See id. at 480-81.  Under 17 M.R.S.A. §§ 314-315 (2012 & Supp. 2013), licensure by the Chief 
of Police to authorize legal beano gaming activities may only be granted “to volunteer fire departments, 
agricultural fair associations, and certain nonprofit organizations as well as to  ‘bona fide resort hotels’ 
whose games return no profits to the hotels.”  
 132. See id. at 482.  The beano games in question generated approximately $50,000 in revenues for 
the Penobscot Nation, per month; the net profit of these revenues was used by the Tribe to fund various 
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the Law Court relied on canons of statutory construction and examined the relative 
unimportance of beano to the history and culture of the Penobscot people, 
ultimately holding that beano games conducted on tribal reservation lands were not 
matters “internal” to the tribe, and were therefore illegal under Maine law.133  
As a matter of first impression, the Stilphen decision set the precedent for 
interpreting section 6206’s “internal tribal matters” language.  Therefore, in 
deciding whether or not the beano games were “internal tribal matters,” the Law 
Court applied the ejusdem generis canon to the context and surrounding language 
found in section 6206, to ascertain the legislature’s intent in the absence of a black-
letter definition.134  Applying ejusdem generis to the “internal tribal matters” 
language of section 6206 (which follows with a listing of matters specifically 
considered to be internal to the tribes),135 the Law Court held that the examples 
provided by the Act were “fundamentally unlike” the operation of a beano game 
and that, as a result, the court’s construction could not embrace within the adopted 
interpretation of “internal tribal matters.”136  
The Law Court’s decision in Stilphen did not rest solely on principles of 
statutory construction.  To tie their decision as closely to legislative intentions as 
possible, the Law Court also applied a historical and cultural analysis to the gaming 
activities in question.137  Relying upon the body of legislative history preceding the 
enactment of MICSA, the Law Court established that only those matters that 
implicate areas of intimate cultural importance fall within the protected 
classification of an “internal tribal matter.”138  Applying this historic/cultural 
                                                                                                     
tribal governmental “programs, including snow and rubbish removal on the reservation, police and 
health services, and home improvement programs.” Id. at 480.  
 133. Id. at 481. 
 134. See id. at 489.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines ejusdem generis as: “[a] canon of construction  
that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be 
interpreted to include only items of the same type as those listed.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th 
ed. 2004). 
 135. See 30 M.R.S.A. § 6206(1) (2012 & Supp. 2013).  
 136. Stilphen, 461 A.2d at 489.  Specifically, the Law Court examined section 6206’s qualification of 
the “internal tribal matters” terminology by applying the ejusdem generis canon to the following list: 
“membership in the respective tribe or nation, the right to reside within the respective Indian territories, 
tribal organization, tribal government, tribal elections and the use or disposition of settlement fund 
income.”  
 137. Id. at 490. 
 138.  Id.  In assessing the application and importance of the historical and cultural implications of an 
activity, the Law Court determined that: during pre-enactment negotiations governing the legislation of 
MICSA the Maine Attorney General understood the “internal tribal affairs” exception to have been 
drafted “in recognition of [the Indians'] unique cultural or historical interest.”  S. REP. NO. 96-957, at 50 
(1980).  The Law Court also relied upon the House Report, which provided protection for the tribes 
against “acculturation” “by providing for tribal governments . . . which control all such internal 
matters.”  H.R. REP. NO. 96-420, pt. 4, at 17 (1980).  Further, the Court examined comment provided by 
Counsel to the Penobscot Nation whose interpretation of MICSA was that it accommodated “the Tribe's 
legitimate interest in managing their internal affairs, in exercising tribal powers in certain areas of 
particular cultural importance . . ..”  Proposed Settlement of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement: Public 
Hearing on the Proposed Maine Indian Claim Settlement Before the Joint Select Committee, 109th 
Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. 25 (Mar. 28, 1980) reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MAINE INDIAN 
LAND CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT (Me. State Law & Legis. Reference Library ed., 2008).  Additionally, 
the Court relied upon a report of the Joint Select Committee on the Indian Land Claims which indicated 
that section 6206’s “internal tribal matters” exception from the application of state law was “in 
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significance standard, the Court held: “[b]eano has played no part in the Penobscot 
Nation's historical culture or development.  It is not uniquely Indian in character.  It 
is not a traditional Indian practice and has no particular cultural importance for the 
Nation.”139  Having found no historical or cultural importance to the Tribe, and 
given its application of ejusdem generis to define “internal tribal matters” in the 
absence of a clear legislative definition, the Law Court held that Maine law 
prohibited beano gaming by Tribe, thereby disallowing the Penobscot from further 
conducting their beano events.140  
The Stilphen Court’s analysis should be understood carefully.   As the first 
case in which MICSA was interpreted, the Law Court was tasked with defining 
what activity constituted an “internal tribal matter” within the meaning of section 
6206, where the Act was remarkably silent on this critical issue.  As a result, the 
Court turned to traditional, tested methods of statutory construction to interpret the 
Act.  The Stilphen decision is a symptom of the type and timing of the case. The 
Court was unable to apply a broad interpretation in Stilphen because beano was not 
traditionally perceived as historically or culturally significant to the Penobscot 
Tribe, at the time.  Therefore, the Court was—for the first time—forced to consider 
the scope of tribal autonomy in regards to legitimate, far-reaching state interests.  
The Law Court thus weighed the State’s legitimate and far-reaching interest in 
regulating gambling and gaming against the Tribe’s right to exercise autonomy in 
its quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal capacity and defensibly held in favor of the 
State. 
In the twenty-five years following the Stilphen decision, the Law Court heard 
and decided five other cases centered around the “internal tribal matters” 
question— Tomer; Dana-Cummings; Winifred B. French Corp.; Great N. Paper, 
Inc.; and Boyce.141  These cases, which both contrast and complement the Court’s 
initially narrow interpretation of section 6206, provide the pool from which the 
Law Court’s current, conflicting jurisprudence has arisen. 
In Boyce, the Law Court was once again tasked with addressing whether or not 
Maine law could be applied to an activity for which “internal tribal matter” status 
was sought.142  However, the holding in Boyce diverges from the Stilphen decision 
given the facts of the case.  The facts of Boyce involved a dispute between the 
                                                                                                     
recognition of traditional Indian practices.”  Joint Select Committee on Maine Indian Land Claims, 
Report to the 109th Legis. on LD 2037 "An Act to Provide for Implementation of the Settlement of 
Claims by Indians in the State of Maine and to Create the Passamaquoddy Indian Territory and 
Penobscot Indian Territory" 109th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. (Apr. 2, 1980) reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE MAINE INDIAN LAND CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT (Me. State Law & Legis. Reference 
Library ed., 2008).  See also Proposed Settlement of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement: Public 
Hearing on the Proposed Maine Indian Claim Settlement Before the Joint Select Committee, 109th 
Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. 7 (Mar. 28, 1980) reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MAINE INDIAN 
LAND CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT (Me. State Law & Legis. Reference Library ed., 2008) (statement of 
Sen. Collins: “there are some exceptions [to full state jurisdiction] which recognize historical Indian 
concerns”). 
 139. Stilphen, 461 A.2d at 490. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Tomer, 2008 ME 190, 962 A.2d 335; Dana-Cummings, 2008 ME 184, 962 A.2d 944; Winifred 
B. French Corp., 2006 ME 53, 896 A.2d 950; Great N. Paper, Inc., 2001 ME 68, 770 A.2d 574; Boyce, 
1997 ME 4, 688 A.2d 908. 
 142. See Boyce, 1997 ME 4, ¶ 4, 688 A.2d 908. 
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Houlton Band of Maliseets and four members of the Tribe’s six-person tribal 
council over the legitimacy of elected tribal officials’ offices.143  Specifically, a 
dispute arose between the defendants (who were removed from office as members 
of the tribal council) and the general members of the Maliseet Tribal Council.144  
As a result, the defendants prevented physical access to the Tribe’s administrative 
building in protest of their removal from office.145  Following the dispute, the Tribe 
elected four replacement members to the council and sought to enjoin the 
defendants from interfering with “tribal administration functions.”146  Although the 
superior court enjoined the defendants from preventing physical access to tribal 
administrative buildings, it refused to levy an injunction pertaining to the 
defendants’ right to be a part of tribal government or, alternatively, recognizing the 
legitimacy of the newly-elected members of the council.147  
On appeal, the Law Court ruled that the trial court had properly acted within 
the boundaries of MICSA by when it declined to address the legitimacy of the 
newly-appointed members; the Law Court classified the issue of the legitimacy of 
the newly-elected members as an “internal tribal matter” protected from State 
interference under section 6206 of MICSA.148  In Boyce, the Law Court interpreted 
section 6206’s ambiguous language more broadly than in Stilphen largely because 
of the contrasting facts between the two cases.  Moreover, in the absence of a 
competing, legitimate state interest, the Law Court readily adopted a broad reading 
of section 6206, so as to permit the greatest possible extension tribal autonomy 
under the quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal status afforded to the tribes by MICSA.  
Although the Law Court could have employed the ejusdem generis principle to 
reach a more narrow reading consistent with Stilphen, the Court chose not to apply 
it.  Instead, the Law Court found—on a principle that reserved to tribal autonomy 
those activities not in contravention of some legitimate, far-reaching state interest 
(here the Tribe’s election of council members)—that this activity qualified as an 
“internal tribal matter” under the protections afforded by section 6206.149  Thus, the 
election was an “internal tribal matter.”  The Law Court’s broad interpretation of 
section 6206 in Boyce stood in sharp contrast to the result reached in Stilphen, and 
seemed to signal how the Court intended to treat future interpretations of section 
6206.  However, this quickly dissipated following the decision in Great Northern 
Paper just a few years later, which considerably frustrated any temporary clarity on 
the matter.150 
Four years after Boyce, and nearly two decades after Stilphen, the Law Court 
had heard and decided just two cases concerning section 6206.  Up to that point, 
both the ambiguity and content of the cases before the Court had significantly 
shaped the landscape of section 6206 interpretation.  As a result, the Court was 
pressed to establish a polarity in the way it interpreted the “internal tribal matters” 
                                                                                                     
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. Id. ¶ 6. 
 147. See id. ¶¶ 4-9. 
 148. See id. ¶ 10. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See Great N. Paper, Inc. v. Penobscot Nation, 2001 ME 68, 770 A.2d 574. 
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language contained in section 6206, causing the legal landscape to be as uncertain 
as it had been prior to the Stilphen decision in 1983.  This changed, however, when 
in 2001, an issue arose between the Great Northern Paper Company and several 
Maine tribes that required the Law Court to once again weigh in on the aperture 
through which section 6206 should be construed in assessing the “internal tribal 
matters” question.151   
The facts of the Great Northern Paper case centered around clean water 
concerns in multiple watersheds that ran through, or were bordered by, tribal lands 
in Maine.152  Specifically, three major pulp and paper companies—Great Northern 
Paper, Inc. (GNP), Georgia-Pacific Corporation (GP), and Champion International 
Corporation (CIC)—operated plants discharging wastewater into the 
aforementioned watersheds that they shared with the tribes.153  Seeking to regulate 
widespread wastewater discharge within its borders, Maine petitioned the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to gain control over all wastewater 
discharge permits under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) program of the Clean Water Act.154  Recognizing the widespread, 
negative impact of the pollutants on watersheds shared with the companies (e.g., 
the Penobscot River, St. Croix River, and Bay of Fundy—into which the St. Croix 
River empties), the tribes held several tribal council meetings, and employed 
several tribal officials to contact the EPA, “urg[ing] the EPA to conclude, in part, 
that the state is not entitled to regulate the water resources within [the tribes’] 
territories, because [the tribes] are entitled to be treated like a separate ‘state.’”155  
                                                                                                     
 151. See generally id. 
 152. See id. at ¶¶ 1-6. 
 153. See id. ¶ 3.  The facts detail that GNP operated pulp and paper mills in Millinocket and East 
Millinocket, discharging their wastewater into the Penobscot River at a site approximately 66 miles 
upstream from the Penobscot Reservation at Indian Island.  See General Distance by Land and River 
from Millinocket to Indian Island, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow "Get Directions" 
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Also discharging wastewater into the Penobscot watershed was CIC, who operated a mill in Bucksport 
approximately 38 miles downstream of Indian Island.  See Great N. Paper, Inc., 2001 ME 68, ¶ 3, 770 
A.2d 574; General Distance by Land and River from Bucksport to Indian Island, GOOGLE MAPS, 
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Maine.  See Great N. Paper, Inc., 2001 ME 68, ¶ 3, 770 A.2d 574; General Distance by Land and River 
from Mouth of St. Croix River to Pleasant Point Reservation, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com 
(follow "Get Directions" hyperlink; then search “A” for "Pleasant Point, ME" and search “B” for 
"Woodland, ME"; then follow “Get Directions” hyperlink and manipulate directions path for 
approximate distances by river). 
 154. Great N. Paper, Inc., 2001 ME 68, ¶ 3, 770 A.2d 574. 
 155. Id. ¶ 4.  In hindsight, the tribes might have been better advised to apply for full intervener status 
(as opposed to “State” status) in any and all state and/or federal regulatory proceedings purposed for 
issuing waste water discharge permits to paper companies discharging into waters that bordered or 
flowed through tribal lands.  Full intervener status would likely have procured a more favorable result 
for the tribes: their standing to intervene is obvious; they would act as an advocate for the imposition of 
more rigorous standards; and, full intervener status would have better positioned the tribes to challenge 
weak standards and/or lax enforcement of adequate discharge standards, including claims for damages 
arising from violations of any permits issued. 
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Upon discovering the tribes’ intentions to obtain “state” status from the EPA 
for regulatory discharge purposes under the Clean Water Act, GNP and the other 
companies served written document requests to leaders of the Penobscot and 
Passamaquoddy tribes.156  In their requests, the companies sought any and all 
documents relating to tribal efforts to gain “state” status and regulatory control over 
water resources within or adjacent to tribal territory.157  The companies stated that 
the purpose of their request was “‘to educate [themselves] regarding issues 
affecting their discharge permits.’”158  The companies also asserted that the 
requested documents were “public records” to which they were entitled under 
Maine’s Freedom of Access Act (FOAA).159  The tribes denied the companies’ 
requests and replied that disclosure documents derived during private tribal council 
meetings under FOAA amounted to regulation of the tribes’ “‘governmental 
process, policies, and procedures,’” shielded from state interference under section 
6206 of MICSA.160 
The companies initiated an appeal of non-disclosure under 1 M.R.S.A. § 
409(1), and argued, inter alia, that the tribes were acting in their municipal status 
under MICSA, and were thus bound to disclose public records under FOAA.161   
The Cumberland County Superior Court denied the tribes’ consolidated motion to 
dismiss and granted the companies’ motion for summary judgment, requiring the 
tribes to turn over the documents.162  When the tribes failed to comply within the 
allotted time period under Title I, the Superior Court, upon review, found the tribes 
in contempt and granted full relief to the companies.163  The tribes then appealed to 
the Law Court.164 
Applying a de novo standard of review, the Law Court examined two issues: 
first, in what capacity were the tribes acting when contacting the EPA; and second, 
does FOAA apply to the tribes when acting in certain capacities with respect to 
internal tribal matters?165 
Before the Court, the tribes argued that application of FOAA to tribal 
documents derived under the auspices of tribal council proceedings would amount 
to an impermissible infringement upon an “internal tribal matter” under section 
6206 of MICSA.166  The companies and State (who joined as a party in interest) 
countered by arguing that pursuant to section 6206 of MICSA, the tribes agreed to 
be bound to a municipal status, and as a result were bound to Maine’s FOAA under 
1 M.R.S.A. § 402, which defines the scope of FOAA to include Maine counties and 
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 157. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6. 
 158. Id. ¶ 6.  
 159. Id. ¶ 5; 1 M.R.S.A. § 402(3) (2012 & Supp. 2013). 
 160. Great N. Paper, Inc., 2001 ME 68, ¶ 7, 770 A.2d 574.  
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municipalities.167 
In its decision, the Law Court first acknowledged that neither FOAA nor 
MICSA explicitly mention of whether FOAA would apply to the tribes.168  As a 
result, the Court delved into a brief history of MICSA—lending particular 
consideration to the municipal status-model that the Act imposed upon the tribes 
and around which “jurisdictional issues” were framed.169  The Court detailed the 
provisions of MICSA (discussed supra) and explained that the tribes are similar to 
regular Maine municipalities in most ways.170  In the same breath, however, the 
Court recognized that the tribes are not traditional municipalities; instead, the tribes 
enjoy special, “distinct” powers and exceptions to which standard municipalities 
are not privileged.171  
Most important to the Court’s analysis, however, was its classification of the 
multiple roles that the tribes may assume “distinct from municipal or governmental 
roles.”172  According to the Court, the tribes “may be recognized” in four distinct 
ways: “as a sovereign nation, a person or other entity, a business corporation, or a 
municipal government.”173  After classifying the manner and capacity in which 
Maine tribes may act, the Court proceeded to develop a four-part test for 
determining whether a state law is applicable to the tribes in light of section 6206 
protections:  
(1) to what entities does the statute at issue apply; (2) are the Tribes acting in the 
capacity of such entities; (3) if so, does the Maine Implementing Act expressly 
prohibit the application of the statute to the Tribes generally; (4) if not, does the 
Maine Implementing Act prohibit or limit the application of the statute in the 
circumstances before the court.174 
Applying this new four-part analysis, the Court examined each component in 
turn.  First, the Court determined that because the legislature, in enacting FOAA, 
intended to open public proceedings (defined as “‘the transactions of any functions 
affecting any or all citizens of the State by . . . [a] municipality’”) to the general 
public, records of municipalities’ actions must be open to the public to assist in 
public business, and, therefore, Maine municipalities fall within the applicative 
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boundaries of FOAA.175  Second, the Court surmised that when the tribes initiated 
a discourse with the EPA seeking treatment as a “state” for the purposes of shared 
regulatory authority (setting NPDES standards under the Clean Water Act), the 
tribes were acting in their governmental capacity “as municipalities.”176  The Court 
supported this assertion by concluding that “[t]hrough their communication with 
the federal government . . . the Tribes are unquestionably acting in their 
governmental capacities,” which under MICSA meant the tribes were acting as a 
municipality.177 
Having determined that FOAA applied to Maine municipalities, and that in 
this case the Maine tribes were acting in their role as municipalities, the Court next 
decided whether MICSA expressly prohibited the application of FOAA to the 
tribes.178  In answering this query, the Court determined that an assessment of the 
meaning of section 6206’s “internal tribal matters” language was necessary.179  In 
deriving the meaning of section 6206’s ambiguous language, the Court forewent 
application of the ejusdem generis approach laid out in Stilphen (discussed supra), 
and instead utilized a five-part analysis described in the federal matter, Akins v. 
Penobscot Nation.180  In rendering its final decision—that the tribes, in this case, 
carried out actions that extended beyond the protected sphere of “internal tribal 
matters”—the Law Court seemed to rely solely on the first factor of the Akins 
analysis, holding that “[w]hen the Tribes, in their municipal capacities, act or 
interact with persons or entities other than their tribal membership, such as the state 
or federal government, the Tribes may be engaged in matters that are not ‘internal 
tribal matters.’”181 
Ultimately, the Law Court affirmed the superior court’s decision, ordering the 
tribes to turn over all documents of communications with the EPA, excluding, 
however, those documents that pertained to tribal minutes and notes.182  
Returning to the spirit of Stilphen and given the posture of the case, the Law 
Court construed section 6206 narrowly and effectively disallowed the application 
of section 6206 immunities to these tribal activities.  Despite taking an alternative 
approach to that adopted in Stilphen (applying Akins in lieu of ejusdem generis 
when interpreting section 6206 narrowly), the effect of the Court’s ruling added to 
the tally of cases narrowly construing the Act.   
Despite the Great Northern Court’s detailed analysis, the real, underlying issue 
at the heart of the “internal tribal matters” question was not properly reached—by 
no fault of the Court, but by the folly of the tribes’ counsel and the deceptively 
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effective tactics of the companies’ counsel.  In short, FOAA was a red herring. 
The FOAA issue, around which the Great Northern case centered, was little 
more than a strategically placed decoy that diverted attention from the central issue 
of whether the tribes, as quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal entities, should be 
afforded heightened consideration by the EPA and the State concerning wastewater 
management in watersheds shared by the tribes and the discharging corporations.  
When counsel for the tribes fixated too closely on the FOAA issue, the forest was 
lost for the trees, so to speak.  FOAA was just one component around which the 
Great Northern decision should have centered.  Instead, counsel for the tribes 
endeavored to challenge the companies on disclosure of documents collected by the 
tribes even after the superior court ruled to allow for non-disclosure of certain tribal 
documents which were entirely internal to tribal governmental practice, and thus 
had no basis for disclosure under FOAA.183  Unfortunately for the tribes, the 
posture of the Great Northern case as a FOAA issue pressed the Court to decide 
the factual dispute in this context.  As a result, the Court did not reach the ultimate 
issue implicated by the “internal tribal matters” question—whether the tribes 
should be afforded heightened consideration in wastewater management practices 
given their unique status and the importance of the impacted watersheds to their 
tribal history and culture (a la Stilphen’s historic cultural analysis).  Instead, the 
case was diverted to a narrow issue to which a narrow interpretation was 
consequently applied. 
In the aftermath of the Great Northern decision, the prevailing legal precedent 
was superficially tipped in favor of narrow interpretations of MICSA, but for 
reasons previously discussed, the Law Court had only truly interpreted the question 
of tribal autonomy in light of state interests, as an “internal tribal matter” twice, and 
had applied both narrow and broad interpretations.  The Court would soon receive a 
chance to clarify the state of its case law precedent in a string of cases occurring in 
the late 2000s in which the Court readily applied broad interpretations of MICSA’s 
ambiguous “internal tribal matters” language.184 
The first of these cases, Winifred, arose out of a dispute between the 
Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Quoddy Times and Bangor Daily News after the 
Tribe refused to permit reporters to sit in on tribal council meetings concerning the 
establishment of a natural gas facility at Pleasant Point.185  The news agencies filed 
suit, alleging FOAA violations, and advanced arguments similar to those 
successfully articulated by the paper companies in Great Northern.186  After 
hearing argument, the superior court found for the Tribe, holding that the tribal 
council meetings were “not public proceedings that must be open to the public 
under FOAA.”187 
On appeal, the Law Court was once again tasked with interpreting the 
ambiguous language of section 6206 to determine whether or not the tribal 
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activities at hand were sufficiently “internal” to the tribe so as to warrant MICSA’s 
provision disallowing state interference with tribal activity.188  Writing for the 
majority, Chief Justice Saufley (who also authored the majority opinion in Great 
Northern) applied part of the framework laid out in Great Northern, and held that 
because the Tribe was not acting in its municipal capacity, state law and FOAA 
were inapplicable to the Tribe.189  
The Winifred decision stands out because it serves as the first “pure” view of 
the “internal tribal matters” question since the Boyce and Stilphen cases decided 
years earlier.  This is because unlike the Great Northern Court, the Winifred Court 
was free from the troublesome posture that confused functional issues with narrow, 
topical issues (i.e. the Tribe in Winifred was not claiming the status of a state and 
the FOAA argument was not a red herring).  As such, the Winifred Court was 
presented with a question more directly related to the “internal tribal matters” 
question: whether or not the tribal activity in question was sufficiently internal (and 
posed no threat to legitimate, far-reaching state interests) so as to warrant the 
greatest possible allocation of tribal autonomy within the boundaries of the quasi-
sovereign, quasi-municipal model.  Once the Court was free to consider this issue 
alone, it was able to make the determination that, unlike the legitimate state 
interests contravened in Stilphen, no such activities existed to warrant a narrow, 
constrictive reading of section 6206. 
Similar treatment of similar issues arose in the Dana-Cummings and Tomer 
cases.190  In both Dana-Cummings and Tomer (as in Boyce), the disputes that 
precipitated litigation involved grievances between tribal members and tribal 
government.191  Dana-Cummings involved a dispute between a member of the 
Passamaquoddy Nation and the Tribal Housing Authority (THA) at Pleasant 
Point.192  Although the case is complex and has an extensive history, the basic facts 
center around the THA’s repossession of tribal member Pamela Francis’s home.193  
In response, Francis sued, and alleged, inter alia, trespass and illegal possession of 
property.194  When the Law Court heard the case, the issue upon review was 
whether the dispute between Francis and the THA constituted an “internal tribal 
matter” within the meaning of section 6206.195  After determining that all parties 
involved were indeed members of the Tribe and that adequate remedy was 
available to Francis through the Tribal Court, the Law Court held that the matter 
was sufficiently internal to the Tribe, thus warranting the protections of section 
6206 and disallowing state interference with “internal tribal matters.”196  
The facts and holding of Tomer are similar.  In Tomer, a member of the 
Penobscot Nation was employed by the Tribe and eventually discharged from his 
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position.197  As a result of his discharge, Tomer filed a complaint with the Maine 
Human Rights Commission alleging employment discrimination and retaliatory 
discharge.198  The Commission dismissed Tomer’s complaint, citing a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under section 6206 of MICSA, reasoning that the matter 
constituted an “internal tribal matter,” and therefore could not state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 4612.199  On appeal, the 
Law Court affirmed the Commission’s dismissal.200  The Law Court reasoned that 
because Tomer had the ability to bring a civil suit against the Tribe in court, rather 
than directly seeking redress through the Commission, there had been no “final 
agency action” under 5 M.R.S.A. § 8002(4).201  Thus, the Law Court declined to 
overturn the Commission’s dismissal of Tomer’s complaint, and held through 
implication that the Commission’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
as a consequence of section 6206 protections was proper—the Tribe’s termination 
of Tomer, an employee and member of the Tribe, constituted an “internal tribal 
matter” with which the State could not interfere.202 
In sum, the Law Court acceded to a broader reading of section 6206 in the 
Winifred, Dana-Cummings, and Tomer decisions than it did in the Stilphen and 
Great Northern cases.  This latest trilogy of cases in MICSA case law evidences a 
clear preference by the Law Court to afford maximum tribal autonomy within the 
boundaries of the quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal model so long as the tribal 
activities in question are deemed sufficiently “internal” to the tribe(s) and do not 
pose a threat to legitimate, far-reaching state interests. 
C.  The MICSA Pendulum: Examining the Impact of the Law Court’s Interpretation 
of Section 6206 
The Maine Indian Claims Settlement (and the subsequent Act memorializing it 
into law) was a bad deal for the Maine tribes.  Not only did the tribes relinquish 
title and legal rights to breathtakingly expansive tracts of their ancestral lands in 
Maine in exchange for a comparatively small financial settlement, but the tribes 
were also saddled with a reduced sovereign status through MICSA’s application of 
the municipality model.  As a result of the ambiguity inherent in section 6206, the 
Law Court has been pressed to issue a collection of opinions that adopt varying 
interpretations of the “internal tribal matters” question.  Following the Court’s 
seemingly mixed treatment of section 6206, no definitive precedent has been firmly 
established.  While the Court has shown a willingness to limit tribal autonomy 
where tribal activities are found to be in conflict with clear and far-reaching 
statewide interests (à la Stilphen), it has also explicitly recognized that the tribes are 
not a conventional municipal entity (à la Great Northern).  In a number of settings, 
the Court has afforded to the tribes more autonomous decision-making prerogative 
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than ordinary municipalities might have received (as in Boyce and the Winifred, 
Dana-Cummings and Tomer “trilogy”).  
Despite limitations placed on their sovereign status under MICSA, the tribes 
are not standard municipalities.  They are both quasi-sovereign and quasi-
municipal.  Further, they have received federal recognition, as memorialized by the 
duties and fiduciary relationship imposed upon the Secretary of Interior and Bureau 
of Indian Affairs in section 6205.203  While certainly limiting the Maine tribes to 
the extent of extinguishing full sovereignty, MICSA specifically endows the tribes 
with powers that “regular” municipalities do not possess—most importantly the 
“internal tribal matters” exception detailed in section 6206.204  As a result of their 
mixed status as quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal entities, the Maine tribes deserve 
to be afforded the most expansive permissions of tribal autonomy possible within 
the boundaries of MICSA and consistent with legitimate state interests.  
Although it will not serve as reparation for centuries of colonialist 
disenfranchisement suffered by the tribes, consideration of Maine tribes as discrete, 
insular groups (similar to suspect class classification)—by broadly interpreting 
MICSA—is both equitable and just.  As previously discussed at length, MICSA 
was a contemporary agreement—it should not be interpreted to bind the tribes to 
historical forms of denigration suffered under centuries of colonialist legacy.  
MICSA not only limits the tribes’ bargaining power by eviscerating their claim to 
vast holdings of valuable land, but it also imposes upon them a restrictive regime of 
limited sovereignty.  If Maine citizens and the tribes are going to live together with 
dignity, MICSA should be tempered by an expansive reading of its ambiguous 
language.  
Looking toward the future, the Law Court has an opportunity to speak clearly 
and espouse the broad interpretations it applied in the latter-MICSA cases.  Given 
the paucity of definitive precedent in this regard, the Law Court’s next decision 
concerning the “internal tribal matters” language could act as the clarion call to 
define how the Act should be interpreted.  One must hope that the case will not be 
tainted with extraneous posturing or with issues that distract from the heart of the 
matter.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
At best, MICSA represents a decidedly inequitable agreement between the 
Maine tribes and the State.  At worst, MICSA serves as the contemporary 
mechanism by which the Maine tribes have been disenfranchised and stripped of 
both their bargaining power and ability to exercise tribal autonomy.  Despite 
acknowledgement of the tribes’ special quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal status by 
the federal government, Congress, the Maine Legislature, and the Law Court, both 
the posture of MICSA case law and the ambiguity inherent in section 6206 have 
generated narrow interpretations of MICSA.  Alternatively, the Law Court has 
evidenced a willingness to broadly interpret MICSA’s ambiguous language in favor 
of deference to tribal autonomy where matters are sufficiently “internal to the 
tribe.”  The Court has not yet, however, had the opportunity to do so properly. 
                                                                                                     
 203. See 30 M.R.S.A. § 6205 (2012 & Supp. 2013).  
 204. See id. § 6206(1). 
2014] WAITING FOR GLUSKABE 567 
The Law Court’s mixed interpretations of MICSA have created an opportunity 
for the Court to speak clearly on the issue in the future and afford a broad 
interpretation to section 6206’s “internal tribal matters” language as they have done 
in near-recent MICSA cases.  A broad interpretation would avoid “black and 
white” characterizations of tribal activities under MICSA, and thereby permit the 
Court to view MICSA’s ambiguous language in varying “shades of gray” so as to 
breathe life into the tribes’ quasi-sovereign, quasi-municipal status and salvage 
what little autonomy MICSA affords the tribes.  Viewing the “internal tribal 
matters” question not merely as whether the tribal activities impact any entity 
outside of the tribal community, but instead focusing on whether the tribal 
activities may be effectuated so long as they are consistent with large-scale state 
interests, permits the Law Court to maximize tribal autonomy under the quasi-
sovereign, quasi-municipal status established under MICSA.  Due to the sensitive, 
discrete cultural values of—as well as the historical and contemporary 
disenfranchisement suffered by—the tribes, this treatment is more than warranted 
where tribal activities are sufficiently aligned with, and do not significantly disturb, 
legitimate and far-reaching state interests. 
Since the beginning of time, when Gluskabe first created the mighty Penobscot 
River and helped the First People to establish a village along its banks, the 
Wabanaki have preserved their culture as a sovereign and resilient people.  From 
the dawn of their civilization—when Gluskabe slew the Water Monster and saved 
the First People—to enduring centuries of harsh colonialist regimes, the Wabanaki 
have maintained their identity, but have done so at great cumulative cost.  Now, 
their culture faces perhaps its most lethal threat yet in the form of MICSA.  And 
though legends of the Wabanaki foretell a time when Gluskabe will once again 
return to save the First People, Maine’s tribes can no longer wait for his return.  
The time for action is now, and the Law Court has an opportunity to provide an 
answer. 
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APPENDIX A205: 
ESTIMATED EXTENT OF THE COLLECTIVE TRIBAL LAND CLAIM AREA 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                     
 205. This map—provided courtesy of the Maine State Law and Legislative Reference Library 
archives—was originally produced by the now-defunct Maine State Planning Office for inclusion in 
materials provided to members of the Joint Select Committee on the Maine Indian Land Claims by State 
officials, circa 1979-1980.  Here, the Author has manipulated the map so as to provide a reference key 
to identify the two depicted area types by shading. 
SCOPE OF STATE 
LANDHOLDINGS 
UNDER TRIBAL LAND 
CLAIMS 
PRE-MICSA  
TRIBAL LAND CLAIMS

